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  This paper is a contribution to the current debate on the privatization of Social Security.  
The term privatization covers a gamut of policy definitions and implications.  We use the term to 
refer to the proposal to invest in the stock market funds that are earmarked for Social Security 
payments.  Currently, the Social Security Trust Fund (hereafter, SSTF) is restricted to invest only 
in United States Treasury securities. 
  Unlike other capital market investments, Social Security is a form of social insurance, in 
that it implicitly guarantees a minimum consumption level for its participants.  Suppose that a 
large fraction of Social Security taxes (Trust funds) is invested in equities.  Given the volatility 
of the United States stock market over the past 70-odd years, there is a distinct possibility that 
Social Security funds invested in the stock market decline in value to a level such that they are 
inadequate to provide a subsistence level of benefits.  In such a situation, the government may be 
compelled to remedy the shortfall by raising taxes on the younger working generations. 
  We argue that any time-consistent discussion on privatizing Social Security must take into 
account this de facto role of the younger working generations as insurers of last resort.  By 
providing a consumption floor for the retired cohort, current wage earners effectively write a put 
option on their risky portfolio, to be honored by succeeding generations.  In this paper, we 
construct a model that allows us to explicitly price this put option.  We do this to give planners 
and policy makers an idea of the order of magnitude of the costs involved. 
  When 20 percent of Trust Fund assets are invested in equities, the highest level currently 
under serious discussion, we find that a put that guarantees the currently mandated level of 
benefits is priced at one percent of GDP for reasonable model parameterizations.  This 
corresponds to a temporary increase in the rate of social security taxation vis-à-vis the current 
level of, at most, 20 percent.  A put that guarantees only 90 percent of the currently mandated 
benefits is priced at roughly .03 percent of GDP, which is proportionately much less.  In contrast 
to the earlier literature, our results fully take into account the non-trivial changes in the 
distributions of security returns resulting from Trust Fund equity purchases.  The equilibrium 
returns we report also achieve non-trivial equity premia and non-trivial equity and risk-free 
  1return standard deviations.  We also explore the inter-generational welfare implications of 
implementing the guarantee. 
  The direct antecedents of our work are the models in Feldstein et al. (2001), Smetters 
(1998, 2001), and Pennacchi (1999).  These papers evaluate a “benefits guarantee” or put in the 
context of partial equilibrium models that take as fixed the distribution of equilibrium returns.  In 
related work, Abel (2001) and Diamond and Geanakoplos (2001) explore the implications of 
investing SSTF assets in the stock market on the aggregate investment and the time path of the 
capital stock.  Our exchange economy shares many features with Abel’s (2001) production 
economy, which, however, focuses on capital stock dynamics.  Our conclusions are broadly 
consistent with those of Diamond and Geanakoplos (2001).  In particular, we also find that 
diversification by the SSTF into equities reduces the equity premium and presents the 
opportunity for welfare enhancements.  Diamond and Geanakoplos (2001) do not present 
numerical estimates of the effects they detail.  Albeit in a simpler context, this estimation is the 
primary focus of our work and, in this sense, it complements many of their conclusions.  While 
recognizing the nature of the risks involved, they also do not seek to value the Social Security 
put.  In a series of papers, Bohn (1997, 1998, 1999) and Campbell et al. (2001) study the risk 
reallocation characteristics of various Social Security financing and payout arrangements, 
especially defined benefit versus defined contribution systems.  Excellent discussions of many of 
the practical issues surrounding Trust Fund stock market investing and Social Security reform in 
general can be found in the volumes edited by Campbell and Feldstein (2001) and Mitchell et al. 
(1999).  Many of the issues underlying the need for Social Security reform of some type are well 
laid out in Geanakoplos et al. (1999) Kotlifkoff et al (1998) and Mitchell and Zeldes (1996). 
  The paper is organized as follows.  In Section II, we describe the economy and define 
equilibrium.  In Section III, we explain how the Social Security put is valued.  We calibrate the 





  2II  The Economy 
 
  We consider a one-good overlapping-generations, pure exchange economy.  It is a version 
of the economy studied in Constantinides et al. (2002), generalized to account for Social Security 
transfers.  Each generation consists of a continuum of consumers and lives for three periods as 
young, middle-aged and old.  Three is the minimal number of periods that captures the 
heterogeneity of consumers across the age groups that we wish to emphasize: the borrowing-
constrained young, the wage-earning middle-aged, and the dis-saving old.  In the calibration, 
each period is taken to represent 20 years.  By restricting our attention to an exchange setting, we 
focus on the purely re-distributive effects.  That is, we assume that the technological or other 
mechanisms that give rise to the yearly aggregate income process of the United States economy 
are invariant to the manner by which Social Security payments are financed.  Abel (2001) 
provides a different perspective. 
  There is one consumption good in each period and it perishes at the end of the period.  
Wages, Social Security taxes, consumption, payments from, and prices of all securities traded in 
the model are denominated in units of the consumption good. 
  We admit two types of securities in positive net supply, a consol bond  and equity.  
Consumers may purchase these securities but realistic borrowing and short sale restrictions are in 
effect.  We consider various scenarios under which the SSTF may purchase either security or a 
combination of them. 
  The bond is default-free and pays one unit of consumption in each period, in perpetuity.  
We think of the bond as a proxy for long-term government debt.  Its supply is fixed at B units in 
perpetuity.
1  The ex coupon bond price in period t is denoted by q and is the price of the claim to 




  Equity in this model is a claim to a residual dividend stream and pays a net dividend d  in 
period t.  We think of equity as the sum total of the claims to firms including net corporate debt 
payments, net rental payments, etc.  The supply of equity is fixed at one share in perpetuity.  The 
t
e
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1We focus on consol bonds for two reasons.  First, it is specious to introduce a short-term (say, one-year) bond in 
this economy because the length of one period is assumed to be 20 years.  Second, the Trust Fund is invested 
primarily in coupon bearing Treasury securities rather than discount T-bills, and we would like the model to reflect 
this fact. issue and repurchase of equities and bonds is implicitly accounted for by the fact that the equity 
is defined as the claim to the net dividend.  We do not model the process by which firms finance 
the net dividend—firms are exogenous to our exchange economy.  The ex dividend price of 
equity in period t is denoted by q .  This equity security represents ownership of the dividend 







II.1  Wage and income profiles 
  Consumers born in period t receive deterministic wage income w , when young.  We 
interpret   to be net of all income (as opposed to social insurance) taxes.  Without loss of 





b, according to the manner by which they are invested.  The tax τ0 is that portion 
paid out immediately to the current old generation under a pay-as-you-go system.  This is largely 
the form of current Social Security finance.  The second and third components, τ0
e and τ0
b, 
represent the taxes invested in equity and bonds, respectively.  The actual quantities purchased of 
each security are τ0
e / qt
e (equity) and τ0
b / qt  (bonds). 
  We assume that the young do not privately participate in the financial markets.
2  Their 
budget constraint is 
 
       c ≤ w0 − τ0
e −τ 0
b      (2.1) 
 
where c  denotes the consumption of the young in period t.  t,0
  When entering middle age, a young consumer either becomes a high-wage earner with 
probability h or a low wage earner with probability 1− h.  Consumers become aware of their 
high or low wage status only upon entering middle age.  Since we assume a continuum of 
consumers, h also represents the fraction of the middle-aged cohort who are high-wage earners; 
similarly, the fraction of low wage earners is 1− h.  A high-wage middle-aged consumer 
                                                 
2This assumption reflects an implicit borrowing constraint in the following sense: under our calibration, consumers 
experience a very steep consumption profile while passing from young to middle age.  The young would not wish to 
save under these conditions.  Consumption smoothing considerations suggest that they would wish to borrow against 
their future (higher) middle-aged income.  In practice, this is difficult to execute without holding other assets 
(collateral).  As we exclude bequests, there is no provision for an accumulation of collateral.  We summarize these 
  4receives wage income w  , out of which he/she pays Social Security taxes, invests privately in 
equity and bonds, and consumes. 
˜ H,t+1
H









 We  denote  by  ct,1 the consumption in period t + 1 of a high-wage middle-aged consumer 
born in period t.  We denote by   and   this consumer’s private purchases of equity and 




+ 1 τH,1, τH,1
e  and τH,1
b are directly 
analogous to the corresponding quantities levied on the young: τH,1 denotes the pay-as-you-go 
component while τH
e
,1 ,1 denote the amounts invested in equity and bonds, respectively.  
The actual quantities purchased of each security are τH,1
e / qt+1
e  (stock) and τ H
b
,1 / q (bonds) t+1
b .  The 
budget constraint for the high-wage middle-aged consumer is 
 




b ≤ ˜  w  H,t+1 −τ H,1− τ H,1
e −τ H,1
b     (2.2) 
 
  Circumstances are similar for the low-income middle-aged consumers, except that we 
assume that they do not privately participate in financial markets.  The notation is analogous to 
that detailed above, except for the superscript/subscript L which identifies this group of 
consumers.  We assume that the wage income of this group, w , is deterministic.  We allow 
for the possibility that 
L,t+1
τ L,1
e  and τH,1
b ≠ τ L,1
b  , and that consumers of different income levels 
pay different Social Security taxes and receive different levels of benefits, which is indeed the 
case in the United States.  The budget constraint for the low-wage middle-aged consumer is 
 
                            c L,t+1 − τ L,1 − τL,1
e −τ L,1
b 3         (2.3) 
 
  For simplicity, we rule out bequests.  For a period-t-born consumer of low middle-aged 




2, plus the Social Security benefits 
                                                                                                                                                             
constraints by the indicated assumption. 
  5
3 Our assumption of non-market participation for this class of consumers is fully exogenous, as their income profile 
looking forward to old age is rapidly diminishing under our calibration.  This is also an empirical fact for a large 
subset of the United States population, yet they do not save.  We offer no explanation for this phenomenon but 
model it as an exogenous fact in the manner indicated.  
     ct,2









   
 








   
 
      (2.4) 
 
The latter includes not only the elements arising from the pay-as-you-go aspects of the system 
(τL,1 + τ0) but also the proceeds of the sales of securities held on the consumer’s behalf under the 
proposed financing alternatives. 
  In the case of a previously high-income middle-aged consumer, consumption in old age, 
ct,2
H  , is further augmented by the proceeds of the sale of the consumer’s privately held securities: 
 
  ct,2










   
 
   + qt+2








   
 
   
4 (2.5) 
 
Equations (2.4) and (2.5) imply that the taxes on the young which are invested in equity 
and bonds benefit the generation that is old in the next period rather than the young themselves, 
when they become old in two periods.  Thus, we do not have the feature of generation-specific 
accounts that are held and augmented for multiple periods, whereby a consumer’s benefits are 
determined by his/her contributions alone.  Rather, our model is one of aggregate equity 
investment by the Trust Fund on behalf of all beneficiaries collectively.  Since the level of public 
debt outstanding is $3.5 trillion, but the assets of the fund are expected to peak at $7.5 trillion, it 
is clear that other assets besides bonds must be purchased by the fund at large and equities are a 
natural first choice.  We thus focus on modeling this aggregate phenomenon and retain the 
current formulation. 
  We rule out negative consumption and personal bankruptcy by imposing the following 
constraints that are easily satisfied under our parameterization: 
 
     zt,1
e ≥ 0, zt,1
b ≥ 0, ct,1
H ≥ 0, ct,1
L ≥ 0, ct,2
H ≥ 0, and ct,2
L ≥ 0.    (2.6) 
                                                 
4Equations (2.4) and (2.5) suggest that taxes paid by the low-income middle-aged exclusively fund the retirement of 
the low-income old, and analogously for the high-income middle-aged, as though the low and high-income 
“accounts” were segregated from one another.  This is not the case in the model; the current representation rather is 
intended to capture the fact that under the present Social Security system, the level of benefits is, at least in part, 
  6 
  We study the equilibrium security prices and the value of the implied Social Security put as 








b { }, maintaining constant 
their respective total values. 
  A consumer born in period t maximizes expected utility 
 










      ( 2 . 7 )  
 
subject to conditions (2.1), (2.2), and (2.4), if of low-income in middle age; or subject to 
conditions (2.1), (2.3), and (2.5), if of high-income in middle age.  ℑ  is the information 
available to the consumer at date t, 
t
β  is the subjective discount factor, and the direct utility 
function is of the standard form uc () 1−γ = ( )
−1c
1−γ ,γ > 0.  It is clear that there are no decisions 
to be made in the first and final periods of a consumer’s life, only the high-income consumers 
have any decision to make, and then only when middle-aged.  Problem (2.7) effectively reduces 
to a one-period problem.
5 
  The aggregate income is given by 
 
       ˜  y  t = w0 + h ˜  w  H,t + (1− h)wL,t + w2 + B+ dt
e.     (2.8) 
 
Note that B captures the aggregate coupon on government debt. 
  We assume that there are J,  j =1,2,...,J , states of nature with transition matrix Π= πij { }.  
We model the joint stochastic process of aggregate income,  ˜  y  t ≡ yj ( ), and the high middle-aged 
wage,  ˜  w  H,t ≡ wj ( ), as a time-stationary Markov chain with a unique stationary probability 
                                                                                                                                                             
determined by the level of prior contributions. 
  7
5In particular, the consumer is unable while young to insure against the event that he/she will receive a low-income 
realization when in middle age.  The likelihood of this event is thus not present in (2.7), and equilibrium is invariant 
to whether or not the consumer knows the future income state. distribution.
6  Since the process is time stationary, it turns out that there exists an equilibrium 
with time stationary pricing and security demand functions. 
  The aggregate dividend is the residual 
 
       dt
e = ˜  y  t − w0 − h ˜  w  H,t − (1 − h)wL,t − B     (2.9) 
 
As a function of the state j, the aggregate dividend is denoted as dt
e = dj ( ). 
  A number of comments are in order.  First, our model identifies the middle-aged consumers 
with a high wage income as the only cohort that invest in equity and bonds.  We acknowledge, 
however, that private ownership of a large amount of securities need not necessarily be 
coincident with high wage income.  Second, the assumption of a non-stochastic wage income for 
the non-stockholding class reflects the empirical observation that the consumption of 
stockholders is more variable than that of non-stockholders; see Mankiw and Zeldes (1991). 
 The  quantities  τH,1 
e  and  τH,1
b are determined by legislative fiat.  By the nature of the budget 
constraint affecting the high-income middle-aged, however, it is possible for that group to negate 
the effects of these taxes, at least in part, by reducing their private security demands.  This 
observation reflects the occasional criticism that the proposal to allow stock market investments 
by the Trust Fund will simply allow the well-to-do to substitute one form of tax advantaged 
investment (401K plans, Keogh plans) for another (Social Security equity investments), with no 
net increase in savings.  More significantly, it also suggests that the equity investment proposal 
will have aggregate consequences for security markets principally in so far as it undertakes 
equity investments on behalf of the current non-stockholding class. 
  Stock market investing by the Trust Fund, with its attendant positive expected returns, 
should help reduce income inequality among the old.  This is a defense sometimes offered on its 
behalf.  Our calibration reflects this feature as well: the degree of income inequality of the old 
declines with the introduction of Trust Fund stock market investing. 
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6 We implicitly interpret   as the after tax income to corporate capital.  McGrattan and Prescott (2000) provide data 
that suggest that over 90 percent of corporate capital is equity capital; we use the indicated approximation (100 
percent of corporate capital is equity).  We assume that income taxes exactly cover government expenditures so that 





   We consider the set of stationary rational expectations equilibria for which the 
consumption and investment policies of the consumers born in each period and the bond and 
equity prices q  and q  are measurable with respect to the current state
b j ()
e j ()   j ( )and are such 
that: (a) each consumer’s consumption and investment policy maximizes the consumer’s 
expected utility from the set of admissible policies while taking the price processes as given; and 
(b) bond and equity markets clear in all periods. 
 Specifically,  let  z j denote the holdings of equity and bonds, respectively, by a 




H,1(j) denote the consumer’s wage income.  
The first-order necessary conditions are also sufficient and are stated below: 
 




















































b(j)]+ w2 + τ0 + τ H,1)[q
e(k)+ d
e(k)]π jk
= β∑  (2.11) 
 
The market clearing conditions are 
 
     B = hz 1
b(j) + h(τ H,1
b + τ0
b)/q
b(j))+ (1 − h)(τ L,1
b + τ0
b)/q
b(j))    (2.12) 
and 




e(j))+ (1 − h)(τ L,1
e + τ0
e)/q
e(j))    (2.13) 
 
  9Definition: An equilibrium for the economy described by equations (2.1) – (2.8) is a set of 
functions  q1
e j ( ), q1
b j ( ), q
e j ( ),q
b j ( ) { ,  } j =1,2,...,J  which satisfy equations (2.9)–(2.13). 
 




III  The Value of the Social Security Put Option 
 
  We consider the scenario in which high-income middle-aged retirees are guaranteed a level 
of benefits MH and low-income middle-aged retirees are guaranteed a level of benefits ML, 
where  ML ≤ MH .  We argue that the current system is effectively pay-as-you-go because the 
assets of the Social Security Trust Fund were $798 billion on December 31, 2000, while the 
present value of all liabilities is estimated to be in excess of $9 trillion.  This system is 
reasonably captured in our scenario by requiring that 
 
and       
τ0 + τ H
1 = MH (τH
e = τ H
b = 0)
τ0 + τ L
1 = ML (τ L
e = τ L
b = 0).
      (3.1) 
 
The current proposals to privatize Social Security can be broadly classified under two 
operational definitions of the term “privatize”. 
 
Plan 1.  Leave the current level of Social Security taxation unchanged while diverting some 
fraction of the tax revenues to equities and/or long-term bonds.  This amounts to requiring 
 
and       
τ0 + τo
e +τ 0
b +τ H,1 +τ H,1




b +τ L,1 +τ L,2
e +τ L,2
b = ML,
     (3.2) 
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7Note that we define (and subsequently compute) steady state equilibria.  We do not consider equilibrium transition 
paths between steady states.  Feldstein et al. (2001) and Smetters (2001) examine this issue.  
with at least one of {τH
e ,τ H
b } and at least one of {τL
e,τ L
b} being strictly positive
8.  Under this plan, 
the resources available for benefits disbursement vary across states.  In particular, if the current 
state is  jand the state next period is k , then next period the payments to the formerly high- and 
formerly low-income retirees are, respectively, 
 
and   
































    (3.3) 
 
  If the model is calibrated to reflect the high mean equity returns observed in the United 
States over the past 70 years, in most states the available resources exceed the mandated benefit 
levels.  In the event of a severe downturn in the securities markets, however, the assets of the 
Trust Fund may fall short of the level necessary to fund promised benefits.  This discrepancy 
would need to be offset with additional taxes.  Opponents to privatization emphasize this latter 
possibility. 
  For simplicity of presentation, let us temporarily focus on the formerly high-wage old 
consumers, and let k* denote a disaster state, if the preceding state is j.  The shortfall in state k is 
 















b(k*) +1] − MH < 0.   (3.4) 
 
A tax surcharge to cover the shortfall is essentially the payoff to a put option written by the 
young and middle-aged and given to the old, with exercise price MH − τ0 − τ H,1
}
, when the 
underlying portfolio is { .  From the perspective of the high-
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8 At the aggregate level must be weighted by the respective fraction of the population to which they apply. See the 
section on calibration, especially equation (4.2). 
M
H and M
Limplicit guarantee is the value of the implied Social Security put.
9  Its value differs across states 
because different current states give different conditional expectations on income and security 
price levels next period. 
  For the high-wage middle-aged consumers, the value in state of this implied benefit,  j
VSSP
H (j), is given by 
 
    
VSSP

























  (3.5) 
where 
 












b + τ H,1
b )/q
b(j)}+ w2 + τ0 + τ H,1




     c1







10   (3.5b) 
 
  Note that equation (3.5) implies that we undertake a marginal analysis from the perspective 
of a middle-aged consumer when the put is not yet in place (i.e., his/her c1
H(j) and   c2
H(k) do not 
reflect put payments).  Since the put increases consumption when the consumer is old and 
reduces it when the consumer is middle-aged, the put reduces the marginal rate of substitution in 
the relevant states.  Therefore, our computations overstate the true value of the put. 
  By way of contrast, we also value the Social Security put extended to the formerly low-




                                                 
9We argue that this burden would fall on the high-income consumers because it would most likely be financed by 
dramatically increasing the range of income subject to Social Security taxes.  For low-income consumers, their 
entire wage income is already subject to the tax. 
10Note that (3.5a) implies that if SSTF assets should exceed the mandated benefits, the incremental difference is paid 
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VSSP

























    (3.6) 
 




  Our formulation allows us to value the put for all possible Social Security financing 









b }.  It also allows us to see how these alternatives influence equilibrium 
returns.  However, we require that M
H − τ0 − τ H,1 = M
L − τ0 −τ L,1,τ L
e = τ H
e  and τL
b = τH
b .  This 
standardization has two implications.  First, the put extended to the low-income old is valued by 
the high-income middle-aged identically as their own put.  The same is true from the perspective 
of the low-income middle-aged consumer.  Together these identifications allow us to report only 
two put values for each set of parameters rather than four.  The second implication is that the 
low-income consumers have a higher proportion of their Social Security Trust Fund assets 
invested in securities.  This reduces the inequality of income in old age.  We maintain these 
conventions throughout the paper. 
  If either of the puts is to have value, there must exist a depression state that the economy 
can enter into with positive probability.  This follows from the fact that the value of taxes 
invested in equity alone will increase on average by nearly a factor of four over 20 years (the 
length of our period), if the average annual real return on equity is seven percent.  Under typical 
normality assumptions on returns, the probability of a twenty-year negative return realization 
would be exceedingly small.  We avoid this unrealistically optimistic scenario by introducing the 
low-probability depression state.  There is, however, another perspective on the put which 
                                                                                                                                                             
to the old.  To assume otherwise would be to add a ‘pseudo-bequest’, something we have ruled out previously. 
11 Expressions (3.5) and (3.6) would appear to suggest that the high-income middle-aged insure only the high-
income old and similarly for the low-income groups.  Since the put payoffs are identical in structure, however, if we 
set ML = MH,  , expression (3.5) can be used to value a put extended by the high-income 
middle-aged to the low-income old.  In a like fashion we could use (3.6), properly parameterized, to compute the 





















  13obviates the need for introducing a depression state, and one that is perhaps more typical of the 
current privatization debate. 
 
Plan 2.  Rather than distribute a surplus, reduce Social Security taxes.  Investing Social Security 
tax revenues in positive return investments would require, on average, less to be taxed today vis-
à-vis the full pay-as-you-go system where the return is implicitly zero.
13  The crucial question 
here is what mean return we may assume.  Given the practical difficulties in forecasting 
conditional returns, it is reasonable to assume that the government would take the mean 
unconditional returns under the full pay-as-you-go system as the benchmark.  After all, the pay-
as-you-go system is the only one for which unconditional historical return data is available on 
which to base an estimate.  Under this plan, the rates τ0
e,τ 0
b,τ H,1
e , and τ H,1
b  are chosen to satisfy 
 
   E   (3.7)  τ 0 + τ H,1 +(τ H,1
e +τ 0
e)(1+ r
e(j,k)) + (τ H,1
b + τ0
b)(1+ r
b(j,k)) [] = MH,
 
and the rates τ0
e,τ 0
b,τ L,1
e  and τ L,1
b are chosen to satisfy 
 






b(j,k)) [] = ML
 
The expectation is the unconditional one under the pure pay-as-you-go system while r  and 
 are, respectively, the equilibrium equity and bond returns when the pay-as-you-go 
economy passes from state j to state k.  The two Social Security put values are then computed 
exactly as in equations (3.5) and (3.6), using equilibrium return data appropriate for the actual 




                                                                                                                                                             
because of the “limited participation” phenomena. 
  14
13 This presumes that the new steady state has been achieved.  During the transition from the full pay-as-you-go 
system to the invest-something-in securities regime, however, taxes will have to be increased as the working 
consumers will have to provide for the then-current old as well as financing security purchases for themselves when 
they are old in the subsequent period.  In our calibration (to follow), we limit ourselves to the case in which a 
maximum 20 percent of benefits is financed by Trust Fund security purchases.  For this scenario, taxes imposed on 
the middle-aged would have to rise by a maximum of 1 percent of their income during the transition year, assuming 
that year did not correspond to a disaster state.  In the following year, taxes imposed on the middle-aged would 




IV  Calibration 
 
  We present results for values of the risk aversion coefficient γ = 4 and 6.  We set the 
(twenty-year) subjective discount factor at β = .44, which corresponds to an annualized value of 
.96, as is typically assumed in business cycle studies.  We set the fraction of the population 
owning stock at h , which implies that 30 percent of the population, the high-income 
middle-aged and the high-income old, have non-trivial investment in the stock market. 
= .45
  The economy-wide state variables are the level of output,  , and the wage of the high-
income middle-aged, w   Calibration is considerably simplified by the observation that 
equilibrium security prices are linear scale multiples of these wage and income variables and 
economy wide parameters.  This follows from the homogeneity introduced by the constant-
relative-risk-aversion preferences and implies that the equilibrium joint probability distribution 
of the bond and equity returns  is invariant to the level of the exogenous macro-economic 
variables  for a fixed w 
˜  y 
˜ H,1.
˜ H,˜  y  joint probability structure.  The scale of the economy is thus 
irrelevant.  Measured as a fraction of the expected output, the value of the Social Security put is 
also scale invariant.  Accordingly, we parameterize the model around the following fundamental 
ratios: 
 
(i)  The average share of income to labor, 
 
       
Ew 0 + h ˜  w  H,t + (1 −h)wL + w2 []
E ˜  y  []
     (4.1) 
 
For the United States economy, this ratio lies in the range [.66, .75], depending on the historical 
period and the manner of adjusting capital income.  For most cases, we choose a value of .7, but 
also undertake a sensitivity analysis. 
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(ii)  The coefficient of variation of twenty-year aggregate income, σ(˜  y )/ E(˜  y ). 
The first major challenge to our calibration exercise is the estimation of this unconditional 
moment.  Unfortunately, a century-long time series provides only five non-overlapping 
observations, resulting in large standard errors of the point estimates.  Standard econometric 
methods designed to extract more information from the time series, such as the utilization of 
overlapping observations only marginally increase the effective precision and still leave large 
standard errors.  We thus consider a wide range of potential values in the range [.10,   .30].
 
(iii)  The coefficient of variation of twenty-year wage income for the middle-aged, 
 
σ(h˜  w  H,t + (1− h)wL)
E(h˜  w  H,t + (1− h)wL)
. 
 
This vital statistic represents another calibration challenge, for the same reasons mentioned 
above.  Ideally, we would like our calibration to reflect the fact that the young experience large 
idiosyncratic uncertainty in their future labor income, but this is captured only in the most 
limited way ( .  Accordingly, we invoke consumer heterogeneity as the 
justification for being liberal in estimating these moments.  In particular, we assume that the 
coefficient of variation lies in the range [.10,  and conduct a sensitivity analysis. 
˜  w  H,t versus wL)
.25]
 
(iv)  The average share of income going to interest on government debt, B / E(˜  y ). 
The United States government interest expense in 1999 was $230 billion, which corresponds to 
2.5 percent of GDP ($9254 billion).  Since our calibration is normalized at E(˜  y ) =122,000 in the 
absence of a disaster state, we choose B = 3,000, which matches this statistic almost exactly, for 
current levels of government debt.  Recall that our consol bonds are a proxy for long term debt, 
and that each bond pays one unit of consumption every period; hence aggregate interest 
payments are also 3000 and 3000/122,000 ≈ .0247.  For this same period, Federal Social 
Security, Medicare, and other income security payments totaled $818 billion, which represented 
8.8 percent of GDP.  We match this figure by setting the respective exercise prices (promised 
  16benefit levels) at MH =12,000 and ML = 10,000
(10,000)(1
.  The level of benefits expressed as a fraction 
of national income then works out to be  
(12,000) − h)
.16
E ˜  w  H,t [] / w
= 0
 
       h+ {} / 122,000 = .089      (4.2) 
or 8.9 percent, with h = .45. 
(v)  The average share of income going to the labor of the young, 
w0
E(˜  y )
. 
Somewhat arbitrarily, we fix the income of the young as w0 = 20,000, which corresponds to the 
ratio w0 / E(˜  y ) ≈
14. 
(vi)  The ratio of the average income of the high-income middle-aged to the low-income 
middle-aged,  .  L
This ratio is fixed at 2.25.  In order to compute upper bounds for the put values we assume that 
the old receive no wage income, w2 .  Their entire income comes either as Social Security 
payments, (for those who were low income as middle-aged), or as Social Security payments plus 
private security holdings (in the case of the high-income middle-aged).  Lastly, the ratio of the 
average income of the high-income middle-aged to the low-income middle-aged was fixed at 
2.25. 
Our base-case calibration is summarized as follows: 
 
wH (1) = 104,000 
 
wH (2) = 76,000 








  y(1) = 151,500 
 
y(2) = 92,500 
y(1) = 151,500 
 
y(2) = 92,500   
  17
                                                 
14 In a private communication John Campbell has pointed out that this figure may be too low. (See Campbell et al. (2001)). Our 
results, however, are quite insensitive to w  as long as   is not high enough that individuals participate in equity markets 
without borrowing.. 
0 w0For these values, Ew 0 + h˜  w  H,t +(1− h)wL + w2 [] / E ˜  y  [ ]= .695 ≈ .7,  σ(˜  y )/ E(˜  y ) = .30, and 
= .18.  σ(h˜  w  H,t +(1− h)wL)/Eh˜  w  H,t + (1 − h)wL []
  It remains to consider the probability structure.  Of special relevance to security pricing are 
(vii) the auto-correlation  , (viii) the auto-correlation corr , and (ix) 
the cross-correlation corr
corr ˜  y  t, ˜  y  t−1 (
˜  y  t, ˜  w  H,t (
) ) ˜  w  H,t, ˜  w  H,t−1 (
).  Lacking sufficient time-series data to estimate these 
statistics, we present results for a variety of correlation structures.  In particular, we consider four 
possible structures: corr ˜  y  t, ˜  y  t−1 () = corr ˜  w  H,t, ˜  w  H,t−1 ( )= .1 or .8 in conjunction with corr ˜  y  t, ˜  w  H,t ( )= 
.1 or .8. 
  There are enough degrees of freedom for the above possibilities to be captured by the 
following 4  transition matrix Π:  × 4
 
   Π:    
   (4.4) 






π +∆ φ −∆ H σ















Given the assumed symmetry of the transition matrix, there are only five parameters to be 
determined in this matrix: φ,π,σ,∆,and H, subject to the condition that the row sums equal one, 
(x) φ + π + σ + H =1. 
  In total, there are twelve  parameters to be determined: the five matrix parameters 
φ,π,σ,∆,and H plus the seven parameters w0,wL,wH,1,wH,2,y1,y2, and B.  (Recall that the income 
of the old is set equal to zero, w .)  The parameters are chosen to satisfy the following eleven 
conditions: the ten target moments, (i)-(x), and the normalization 
2 = 0
Ey [ ]= 122,000.  That leaves 
one extra degree of freedom that is chosen to ensure that all the elements of the transition matrix 
are positive.  The precise values of φ,π,σ,∆,and Hare given below.  In the discussion and 






Corresponding to Various Correlation Structures 
corr ˜  y  t, ˜  y  t−1 () and
corr ˜  w  H,t,˜   w  H,t−1 ()
 
corr ˜  y  t, ˜  w  H,t ( )  φ  Π  σ  Η  ∆ 
.1 .1  .5298 .0202 .0247 .4253  .01 
.1 .8  .8393 .0607 .0742 .0258  .03 
.8 .1  .5496 .0004 .0034 .4466  .03 
.8 .8  .8996 .0004 .0034 .0966  .03 
 
  The preceding probability structure lacks a disaster state.  As we have noted under Plan 1, 
the Social Security put is likely to come into force most significantly in a disaster state 
comparable to the Great Depression of the 1930s, where output fell to 2/3 of its 1929 level.  
During such episodes, security prices are likely to be low and to persist in that state.  We 
accommodate the potential for this sort of event by modifying our stochastic process on the 
output and high-income wage to admit the disaster state,  y3,wH,3 ( ), where  and 
.  The probability transition matrix is modified as 
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The ηi parameters govern the likelihood of entering the disaster state while the A  parameters 
describe the likelihood of exiting from it.  The values of the puts are relatively insensitive to the 
patterns of   and 
i
Ai ηi , provided they result in the same stationary probability of disaster.  This is not surprising as (European-style) put options depend only on the distribution of the states at 
expiration, rather than the paths to these states.  In all our cases, we choose {  and { Ai} ηi} such 
that the stationary probability of the disaster state is approximately ten percent. 
In Table 1, we report historical estimates of the mean and standard deviation of the 
annualized, 20-year holding-period-return on the CRSP value-weighted index of NYSE, AMEX, 
and NASDAQ stocks; and on the Ibbotson US Government Treasury Long Term bond file.  The 
mean (equity or bond) return is defined as 100 x [{sample mean of the 20-year holding period 
return}
1/20 - 1].  The standard deviation of the (equity or bond) return is defined as 100 x [sample 
std {(20-year holding period return)
1/20}].  We also report the mean equity premium, defined as 
the difference of the mean return on equity and the mean return on the bond; and the standard 
deviation of the premium, defined as 100 x [ sample std {(20-year equity return)
1/20 - (20-year 
bond return)
1/20}].   
  In Table 1 the (real) mean equity return is 5% - 6% with a std of 3% - 4%; the mean bond 
return is about 1% ; and the mean equity premium is 5% - 6% .  (We stress that what we refer to 
here as the standard deviation of equity return is the std of the annualized 20-year equity return, 
as defined above, and is very different than the standard deviation of the 1-year equity return 




V  Results 
 
  First, we consider the case τ0
e = τ0
b = 0: the benefits received by the old from security 
purchases, whether privately or publicly, are exclusively determined by their own contributions 
as middle-aged consumers.  We consider each of the proposed plans in turn, and focus not only 
on the value of the put, but also on the effects of such policies on the properties of the 
equilibrium security returns. 
 
  20V.1  Social Security Plan 1 
  We present the results for Plan 1 when the SSTF revenues are invested in either equity or 
bonds.
15  In all cases, the amount invested is 2,000 (τH,1
e = τ L,1
e  = 2,000, or τH,1
b = τ L,1
b  i.e., 
τH,1
b = τ L,1
b = 2,000), which is approximately 18 percent of SSTF revenues.  The latter figure is an 
upper bound of any proposal that is likely to be accepted in the immediate future.  Note that 2000 
also represents the maximum possible put payoff at expiration; this is 1.6 percent of the average 
output in normal times,  = 122,000.  In this scenario, the source of value for the put is the 
presence of the disaster state.  For all the cases reported, the stationary probability of a disaster 
state is about ten percent and represents a 45 percent drop in output relative to the mean level.
Ey []
16 
  When the SSTF revenues are invested in stock (Table 2, with τL
e = τH
e = 2000, 
τH
b = τ L
b = 0), the average value of the high-income put, EV SSP
H , is slightly more than one percent 
of the expected national income, with a standard deviation of 0.75 percent across all the cases 
when the risk aversion coefficient is 4.  For the low-income consumers, the corresponding values 
are as high as 2.24 percent of the expected national income, with a standard deviation of 1.34 
percent.  The results are relatively uniform across all the probability structures because the value 
of the put depends upon the stationary distribution of income, which is fairly constant across all 
the cases.  Note that the calculations of the put use the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of the 
corresponding income groups.  If all the calculations use the MRS of the high-income middle-
aged, then VSSP
H  and VSSP
L  coincide in every state. 
  Since the disaster state is extreme, these figures provide an upper bound on the value of the 
put.  These figures suggest a 95 percent upper bound probability that VSSP
H  ≤ 3 percent and V  ≤ 
6 percent.  The former figure is more realistic as any shortfall is more likely to be made up with 
higher taxes on the middle-aged high income population cohort.  We have conducted a wide 




  The value of the put is drastically reduced if the old generation is guaranteed only 90 
percent of the mandated benefits rather than 100 percent of the benefits.  The mean value of the 
                                                 
15 Combinations of stock and long-term bond financing lead to put values intermediate between the entries reported 
here. 
16 We say 'approximately' because the different matrix structures give stationary probability distributions, which 
differ slightly from one another. 
17 There is another sense in which these estimates are upper bounds.  In computing the relevant MRS we do not take 
  21put decreases to a maximum (across all probability structures) of .028 percent, from the 
perspective of the high-income middle-aged.  If we take the viewpoint of the low-income 
middle-aged consumer, the put declines to roughly 1/10
th of its full benefits value. 
  These figures ignore the fact that in states of high security prices the fund would be able to 
provide benefits in excess of the mandated minimums, a surplus surely available to be carried 
over to future periods at least in part.
18  This would reduce future put costs.  At 10 percent, our 
stationary probability of disaster is also high; if this probability is reduced to 5 percent, the 
corresponding mean values of the puts decrease by one half. 
  When the SSTF revenues are invested in bonds, the mean value of the put for the high-
income middle-aged declines relative to equity investment, partly because bonds are less risky.  
However, for the low-income middle-aged, the opposite is true.  This observation reflects the 
fact that the shift to bond investment results in a lower return (see Table 3).  The MRS of the 
low-income middle-aged is, on average, higher since their old age income is, on average, less 
than under equity investing.  For the low-income middle-aged, this latter effect (which increases 
put values) dominates the former one (less risky investment vehicle) to create significant 
increases in V .  For the high-income middle-aged, however, the same effect is much less 
strong because they have other investing alternatives (in particular, they hold all the equity) for 
maintaining the smoothness of their income stream. 
SSP
L
  In Table 3, we present the effect of Plan 1 on equilibrium security returns. For all 
securities, the mean return is defined as 100 x [{mean of the 20-year holding period return}
1/20 - 
1].  The standard deviation of the (equity, bond or consol) return is defined as 100 x [std {(20-
year holding period return)
 1/20}].  The mean equity premium return over the bond return, 
“MEAN PRM/BOND”, is defined as the difference between the mean return on equity and the 
mean return on the bond.  The standard deviation of the premium of equity return over the bond 
return, “STD PRM/BOND”, is defined as 100 x [sample std {(20-year equity return)
1/20 - (20-
year bond return)
1/20}].  The mean premium of equity return over the consol return, “MEAN 
PRM/CONSOL”, and the standard deviation of the premium of equity  
                                                                                                                                                             
into account the implicit smoothing provided by the put. 
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the case of the high-income middle-aged consumer.  We cannot explicitly account for this carry-over, however, as 
we do not admit a storage technology. return over the consol return, “STD PRM/CONSOL”, are defined in a similar manner. 
  Plan 1 increases prices and substantially reduces expected returns and return standard 
deviations.  The effect is greatest on equity returns when the SSTF revenues are invested in 
equity (τH
e = τ L
e = 2000) and greatest on bond returns, when the SSTF revenues are invested in 
bonds (τH
b = τ L
b = 2000).  When the SSTF invests exclusively in equity, in particular, mean 
equity returns decline by about 3 percent
19, long term bond and risk free returns simultaneously 
decline by 1.5 percent and .8 percent, respectively.  When the SSTF invests exclusively in bonds, 
the mean risk free rate declines by about 1.4 percent, the mean long-term bond rate by 1.75 
percent and the mean equity rate by 2.3 percent.  In fact, for the reported parameterization, the 
real risk free rate becomes negative.  In all cases, the premium declines compared to the pay-as-
you-go system.  The fact that the qualitative impact of the SSTF’s forays into the market is 
similar irrespective of the investment vehicle chosen reflects the considerable substitutability of 
equity and bonds.  While the magnitude of Trust Fund participation in the financial markets is 
not large when measured as a percentage of national income, this simple model suggests that its 
influence on equilibrium returns may be substantial
20.  The counterfactually high level of mean 
security returns is due largely to the extreme income, dividend, and wage uncertainty we have 
imposed upon the model.  It represents an unattractive feature of seeking upper bound estimates 
for put values. 
  The results obtained above are due almost exclusively to the securities market participation 
by the Fund on behalf of low-income consumers who would otherwise not choose to hold stock 
or long-term debt.  High-income consumers can largely undo the securities purchases made on 
their behalf by correspondingly reducing their private purchases, a conclusion that is apparent 
from an inspection of their budget constraint.  Low-income consumers benefit from these 
purchases in that, on an expected basis, they are better off as old persons relative to their 
situation under pure lump sum taxation.  For the parameterizations of Tables 2 and 3, under pure 
lump sum taxation, the consumption of the low-income old is $10,000; if τL
e = 2000, its expected 
value is roughly $26,000 (the result is obviously not true state by state, however).  It is on this 
                                                 
19 Recall in our calibration we are investing only 18% of the SSTF in securities. The decline will be considerably more if 100% 
of the Trust Fund is invested in securities. 
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20 We stress that any privatization scheme explicitly recognize this when estimating the expected rate of return on Trust Fund 
investments. basis that some have argued for SSTF stock market participation as a mechanism for reducing 
old age income inequalities. 
  Mention should be made of the sensitivity of our results to alternative parameter 
specifications.  First, we consider changes in the CRRA and the results across all the probability 
structures are essentially the same.  In Table 4, we report results for both the high and low 
correlation cases.  If the RRA coefficient increases from γ=4 to γ=6, the expected value of the 
put to the high-income middle-aged, EV SSP
H , approximately doubles to two percent of national 
income; the standard deviation approximately doubles as well.  For the low-income middle-aged, 
the increase is much larger and exceeds ten.  The general explanation for these results is 
straightforward: as consumers become more risk averse, the income insurance represented by the 
put becomes more valuable to them.  The fact that the change is so much greater for the low-
income middle-aged is attributable to the higher MRS attendant to their much greater inter-
temporal income inequality. 
  Significant changes are also manifest in the pattern of security returns.  In the presence of 
greater risk aversion, all security returns decline and the risk free rate becomes negative.   
Consumers that are more risk-averse desire smoother inter-temporal consumption profiles and 
the only way to accomplish this objective is to demand more securities of both types (their 
returns being less than perfectly positively correlated allows for some diversification).   
Therefore, prices increase, but do so differentially, and the equity premium increases.  These 
remarks and those of the preceding paragraph above represent a brief summary of the results 
presented in Table 4. 
  Of additional interest is the effect on put values and equilibrium return distributions of 
changes in the incidence of privately held stockholdings (the parameter h).  These are presented 
in Table 5, in this case of a single representative probability structure.  It is seen that as the 
fraction of the population participating in the securities markets rises, equilibrium returns decline 
sharply.  Simultaneously, the expected value and standard deviation of the put rise.  The former 
result is due, in part, to the enhanced volatility of equilibrium security (underlying asset) returns 
and, in part, to the lower mean returns which afford less opportunity for consumption smoothing 
and thus create a higher average MRS for consumers of both income categories. 
 
  24V.2  Social Security Plan 2 
  Recall that the idea underlying this plan is for the SSTF to take advantage of the potentially 
higher returns afforded by stocks (if history repeats itself), by lowering Social Security taxes 
rather than enhancing benefits.  Compared with a pay-as-you-go system (with the implicit zero 
rate of return), less needs to be set aside today in order to create the required level of benefits in 
the future.
21  The portion of the Social Security tax devoted to security purchases must have a 
value equal not to the associated benefits but to their present value.  The issue is only the rate at 
which the benefits are to be discounted, recognizing that the very institution of such a policy will 
have equilibrium effects on the rates themselves. 
  For the purposes of our calculation, we set the discount rate equal to the prevailing (in the 
model) rate under the pay-as-you-go system.  This choice is based on the following two 
arguments.  First, it reflects ‘historical’ experience and can be argued on that basis, and (at least 
in our context) justifies the greatest tax relief.  Second, general equilibrium effects are almost 
surely too subtle to be computed with any confidence in a real world context.  By adopting this 
convention, we maintain our objective of seeking reasonable upper bound estimates for the put 
values.  That we would obtain an upper bound follows from the fact that the public purchase of 
securities on behalf of the Trust Fund in general serves to lower equilibrium returns vis-à-vis 
their pay-as-you go levels.  The present value of future benefits should thus be higher than we 
assume, thereby increasing the likelihood the put will be in the money at its expiration. 
  In Table 6, we present the results of this exercise when we eliminate the disaster state (i.e., 
ηi ≡ 0∀i, and  ,  ,  , and  A1 = .5 A2 = .5 A3 = 0 A4 = 0) for a representative pair of cases.  Under 
Plan 2, there is no longer a need to retain the possibility of disaster to guarantee that the put has 
value since the plan at best guarantees only the expected level of benefits and not their level state 
by state.  Subsequently we reintroduce the disaster state.  For economy of presentation, only the 
results for the probability structure corresponding to two correlation structures are presented; the 
results are similar across the other probability structures. 
  Both put values are very small—at least from the perspective of the high-income middle-
aged.  In this case, the value of the put is less than .5 percent of National Income.  If it were 
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21 For example, Feldstein and Samwick (1997) argue that an 18.75 percent payroll tax rate necessary to sustain 
promised benefits as the United States population ages could be replaced with a 2 percent tax rate in the long run 
under all equity investing. guaranteed by the high-income middle-aged (the most likely scenario), this same estimate would 
also apply to the put insurance of the low-income elderly.  As before, the substantially higher 
values of V  are due to the much greater average MRS attendant to their less smooth inter-
temporal income profiles under this plan.
SSP
L
22  Although we do not report them, the corresponding 
values are almost insignificant if the guarantee is again reduced to 90 percent of currently 
mandated benefits. 
  Security returns reflect the by-now expected pattern: Trust Fund purchases increase net 
demand and prices, and lower returns.  That our estimates are not too far off the corresponding 





values coincide with the actual prevailing rates) is confirmed by the relatively modest decline in 
equilibrium rates.  The fact that rates are in general lower than in Tables 2-4 reflects the reduced 
income and dividend uncertainty in the absence of a disaster state. 
  In Table 7, we present the corresponding results when the disaster state is reintroduced.  
The natural comparison of Plan 1 and Plan 2 can be found by matching the respective panels of 
Tables 2 and 3 with the corresponding ones in Table 7.  Under Plan 2, the VSSP
H  rises as high as 
2.5 percent of average national income; for V  it is as high as 30 percent.  This is not entirely 
surprising: under Plan 2, the likelihood of a Social Security shortfall, and, should it occur, the 
magnitude of the shortfall, are both greater than under Plan 1 because the amounts invested are 
much lower (227.6 vs. 2000 in the case of equity, 818.25 vs. 2000 in the value of long term 
bonds for the low correlation scenario).  The huge increase in the V  is due again to the high 
average MRS value for the low-income middle-aged; their consumption here is much less 
effectively smoothed than in Tables 2 and 3 above.  There is also a difference in the pattern of 
equilibrium returns across the various financing options.  Under Plan 2, all rates decline 






  In our search for reasonable upper bounds on the put, there is one more experiment open to 
us: use the rates for a non-disaster economy to determine the level of Plan 2 investments in a 
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22 In particular, for the states in which the security returns are negative, the MRS of the low-income middle-aged 
consumers is much greater than under the pure pay-as-you-go system. disaster state economy.  The idea here is to examine the consequences of the Trust Fund ignoring 
the possibility of a disaster state. 
  These results are presented in Table 8 for the representative case.  Under equity financing, 
VSSP
H  achieves a value of 2.44 percent of average National Income, which is less than the 
corresponding figure under disaster anticipation (2.49 percent).  If long-term bond financing is 
used, however, V  rises to 33.51 percent of average income, thereby vastly exceeding the 23.65 
percent under disaster anticipation (Table 7).  Why the conflicting results?  Let us consider V  
first, as its explanation is most straightforward.  There are two effects.  First, the equilibrium risk 
free rate under the disaster scenario (3.17 percent) is lower than under the no disaster one (5.92 
percent) since risk free securities are more desirable in the latter environment.  The Fund thus 
anticipates earning a higher return on its investments than actually turns out to be the case.  In 
addition, by anticipating higher rates, the Fund invests less (633.1) than a proper equilibrium 
analysis would presume (818.5).  These two effects reinforce one another to reduce the value of 





  Under equity financing, the analysis is somewhat more complex.  Since the amount 
invested is determined under a no disaster scenario, the assumed rate (10.52 percent) is lower 
than in the corresponding disaster (11.48 percent) scenario and more is invested (270 vs. 227).  
Ceteris paribus, this should reduce the value of the put.  Working in the opposite direction is the 
rate effect: the higher equity purchases on behalf of the low-income middle-aged lowers 
equilibrium returns (10.03 percent) below the disaster level.  Thus, rates are not as high, an effect 
that, ceteris paribus, should increase the value of the put.  For this set of cases, the latter effect 
dominates the former to reduce VSSP
H  to 2.44 percent of output.  The general pattern of security 
returns does not much differ from what has been presented earlier. 
 
V.3  Extending Security Investing to the Young 
  A slight generalization of our model can be effected if we admit Social Security 
investments in stock and risky debt financed by taxes imposed on the young generation as well 
as the middle-aged.  Given the high average returns on these securities it is natural for the Fund 
to wish to invest as much as possible in these vehicles.  To do so breaks the direct connection, 
however, between a middle-aged consumer’s Social Security investments in risky securities and 
  27his/her own level of retirement benefits that is present in the current formulation.  Rather, under 
this formulation, both young and old contribute to a general pool of securities, the aggregate 
value of which in part determines the welfare of the generation that will be old in the subsequent 
period.  Therefore, the young do not directly benefit from their own Social Security purchases 
when they themselves are old. 
  The results of this exercise are contained in Tables 9 and 10, which are, respectively, the 
direct analogues of Tables 2 and 3, except that the total Social Security investment in stock 
and/or debt is split evenly between the young and middle-aged ($1000 to each) holding each 
generation’s (and each middle-aged income category’s) aggregate tax payment constant.  A 
quick comparison of the results in Tables 2 and 9 reveals that this modification produces 
virtually no change in the value of the Social Security put, across the various probability 
transition matrices.  A comparison of Tables 3 and 10 leads to an even stronger result of security 
returns: they are identical vis-à-vis their statistical summaries. 
  The intuition behind this finding is straightforward: conditional expected security returns in 
all states are sufficiently high that the high-income middle-aged do not wish to reduce their 
private holdings of securities even as the Trust Fund invests on their behalf.  In effect, the 
transfer does not affect overall demand from the perspective of this group of consumers.   
Similarly, the reduction in exogenous demand by the Trust Fund on behalf of the low-income 
middle-aged is exactly offset by the corresponding increase for the young.  As a result, total 
demand is unaffected on a state-by-state basis, leaving security return patterns largely 
unchanged. 
 
V.4 Welfare  Comparisons 
  The welfare implications of the Social Security put critically depend on the consumer’s age 
and income status.  The welfare measures are defined in Appendix 1.  For all the 
parameterizations considered in this paper, the high-income middle-aged suffer a loss in welfare 
if the put program is implemented.  This follows from the fact that their income profiles, for all 
equilibria we consider, are highly upward sloping because of their private purchases of 
securities.  The presence of the Social Security put payment has the effect of making it more so, 
with the consequent welfare reduction. 
  28  For the low-income middle-aged, however, the situation is different.  Their age-based 
income profile, in particular, is downward sloping; for this group the institution of put protection 
represents real consumption smoothing, and their welfare consequently improves. 
  From the perspective of a young consumer who is uncertain as to his/her income status 
when achieving middle age, these two alternatives must be weighted by their respective 
probabilities.  Since the marginal utility, when old, of a low-income middle-aged consumer is so 
much higher than that of a high-income consumer, the net effect of adding the put is to increase 
welfare.  For a young consumer the percentage increase in welfare, relative to the base no-put 
case is found in Table 11, Panel A, for the scenario of all equity investing (the case in which the 
put payments are greatest).  Measuring welfare as the expected utility of a young consumer 
looking forward, the percentage welfare increase when the put is introduced is in the 
neighborhood of 3.4 percent. 
  Recognizing the problems inherent in utility comparisons, we also compute the maximum 
an old consumer would be willing to pay to the young in order to create the put mechanism.  As 
shown in Panel B, this amount represents approximately a one percent increase in young 
consumption when averaged across our various probability structures. 
 
V.5  Comparison with Earlier Literature 
  We compare our results with those of Smetters (2001) and Feldstein and Samwick (1997).  
Smetters (2001) considers the case of complete privatization and fixes the Social Security tax 
rate such that the assets of the Fund fully cover, on an expected basis, the ex ante promised 
benefits (the present value of the expected shortfall is zero).  When the value of the put is added, 
however, the reduction in unfunded liabilities is only 21.1 percent (see Smetters (2001), Table 
3.1, ψ = χ = 1, e  = .07).  Since the current level of unfunded benefits is approximately $8 
trillion, or 80 percent of GDP, this calculation implicitly values the put at 63 percent of GDP. 
  Our earlier estimate of the value of the put is significantly smaller than that of Smetters 
(2001) partly because we do not consider complete privatization.  We estimate the value of the 
put under complete privatization by setting parameter values τ0 = τ L,1 = τ H,1 = 0, 
τH,1
e = (1.1052)
−2012,000 = 1623 ,  τL,1
e = (1.1052)
−2010,000 = 1353, and φ =  .5298  in our Plan 
2.  Other correlation structures produce similar results.  For the parameterization otherwise as in 
  29Table 6, this calculation yields EV SSP
H ≈ .03Ey [ ], which is still small.  If we retain the indicated 
parameter values, yet admit a disaster state in the manner of Table 7, then EV SSP
H = .19Ey [ ], 
which is almost one third of the Smetters (2001) value
23. 
  It is also of interest to compare our results with the “two percent rule” propounded in 
Feldstein and Samwick (1997).  These authors demonstrate that a two percent contribution level, 
when invested in equities, would be able to replace fully the current pay-as-you-go system.  In 
Table 6 (Plan 2) mean return levels are such as to suggest that the corresponding tax levels 
imposed on the high and low-income middle-aged, respectively, under full equity investing (no-
pay-as-you-go or bond components) would be 1623 and 1353 (see calculation above).  As a 
proportion of the average underlying wage for that same case, these figures represent an average 
tax rate of 2.28 percent, which is broadly consistent with Feldstein and Samwick (1997). 
 
 
VI  Concluding Remarks 
 
  If a large fraction of Social Security taxes is invested in equities, there is a distinct 
possibility that Social Security funds decline in value to a level such that they are inadequate to 
provide a subsistence level of benefits to the old generation.  Since Social Security is a form of 
social insurance that implicitly provides a guarantee on a minimum consumption level of the 
older generation, the government may be compelled to remedy a shortfall by raising taxes on the 
younger working generations.  We argue that any time-consistent discussion on privatizing 
Social Security must take into account this de facto role of the younger working generations as 
insurers of last resort.  We price this implicit insurance provided by the younger working 
generations as a put option on the value of the Social Security Trust Fund with strike price equal 
to the implicit guaranteed level. 
  From the perspective of the high-income middle-aged—the group most likely to have to 
cover shortfalls of the Social Security Trust Fund—the value of the put is estimated to be slightly 
in excess of one percent of GDP under our most realistic scenario (Plan 1).  This corresponds to 
                                                 
23 This leaves open the question of why we achieve a put valuation of, at best, one-third the Smetters value. 
  30
 $100 billion, or at most a 25 percent increase in Social Security taxes, if it were to be honored.  
A put that guarantees only 90 percent of the currently mandated benefits is priced at roughly .03 
percent of GDP, which is proportionately much less.  We do not regard the cost of even the 100 
percent guarantee as insurmountably large.  Instituting such privatization policies is further seen 
to give rise to a substantial increase in security prices with the consequent reduction in returns.  It 
is also seen to substantially reduce income inequality across the old consumers.  This latter 
consequence may ultimately be the greatest argument in its favor. 
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  33Appendix: Definitions Used in the Welfare Analysis 
 
1.  Expected utility (welfare) of a representative consumer in the absence of the put: 
EU( )
No Put








































, π(j) stationary probabilities, j = 1,2 
2.  Expected utility (welfare) of a middle-aged high-income representative consumer in the 
absence of the put: 
EUH
M()
















3.  Expected utility (welfare) of a middle-aged low-income representative consumer in the 
absence of the put: 
EUL
M()
















4.  The payoff to the put in state j when the preceding state is      , for the high-income old aged 
is given by: 
  
P
H( ,j) = max 0,MH −τ 0 − τH,1−
τ0





   
 









   
 









   
 
For the low-income old aged, the analogous quantity, denoted P
L (    , j), is given by: 
  
P
L( , j) = max 0,ML − τ0 − τ L,1−
τ 0





   
 









   
 









   
 
Accordingly, the introduction of the put modifies consumption for the middle-aged and old of 
each income type: 
 
           ˆ  c  t,1
H( ,j) = ct,1
H(j)− P
H( , j) 
         ˆ  c  t−1, 2
H (j,k) = ct−1,2
H (k)+ P
H(j,k) 
           ˆ  c  t,1
L ( ,j) = ct,1
L (j)− P
L( , j) 
         ˆ  c  t−1, 2
L (j,k) = ct−1,2
L (k)+ P
L(j,k) 
  345.  The Expected utility (welfare) of a middle-aged high-income representative consumer in 
the presence of the put is: 




Put = π( )
  ∑ π  j
j=1
5
∑ u{ˆ  c  t,1
H( , j))+ βπ j,k
k=1
5









   
 
The analogous quantity for the middle-aged low-income representative consumer in the presence 
of the put is: 




Put = π( )
  ∑ π  ju(ˆ  c  t,1
L ( , j))+ βπ jk
k=1
5












   
 
6.  The expected utility (welfare) of a representative consumer in the presence of the put: 
   Eu()
Put = u(ct,0)+ β[hEuH
M()
Put + (1− h)EuL
M()
Put] 
7.  The gain in expected utility (welfare) of a representative consumer if the put is 
incorporated: 
   Gain  ≡ Eu(  )
Put - Eu(  )
No Put 
8. Maximum  amount,  xL that would be transferred voluntarily from an old low-income 
consumer in exchange for introducing the Social Security put: 
   xL satisfies  . 
  
π( )
  ∑ π  ,j
j=1
5
∑ u(ˆ  c  t,1








∑ u(ˆ  c  t,2





Note that the transfer xL is the same across all the states.  The analogous quantity for the high-
income individuals results in a negative xH. 
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TABLE 1 
 
Real Returns   2/1947  - 12/1996 
 
 EQUITY  BOND  PREMIUM 
 
MEAN 5.5% 0.12%  5.38% 






Nominal Returns   1/1926  - 12/1996 
 
 EQUITY  BOND  PREMIUM 
 
MEAN 11% 4.02%  6.98% 




















We report empirical estimates of the mean and standard deviation of the annualized, 20-year holding-period-return on the CRSP 
value-weighted index of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks; and on the Ibbotson US Government Treasury Long Term bond 
file.  The mean return (on equity or the bond) is defined as 100 x [ {sample mean of the 20-year holding period return}
1/20 - 1 ].  
The standard deviation of the (equity or bond) return is defined as 100 x [ sample std {(20-year holding period return)
1/20 } ].  The 
mean premium is defined as the difference of the mean return on equity and the mean return on the bond.  The standard deviation 
of the premium is defined as  100 x [ sample std {(20-year equity return)
1/20 - (20-year bond return)
1/20 } ].  Estimates on real 
returns cover the sample period 2/1947 - 12/1996, with 358 overlapping observations.  Estimates on nominal returns cover the 
sample period 1/1926 - 12/1996, with 611 overlapping observations. 
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TABLE 2 





CORRELATION  (˜  y ,˜  w  H) = 0.1 
 
  LOW SERIAL AUTOCORR. 
OF y AND OF w
1  (0.1) 
HIGH SERIAL AUTOCORR. 
OF y AND OF w
1  (0.8) 
  τH
b =τ L
b = 0 
τH
e =τ L






b = 2000 
τH
b =τ L
b = 0 
τH
e =τ L






b = 2000 
MEAN VSSP
H   1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 
STD OF VSSP
H   0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
MEAN V   SSP
L 2.2 2.4 2.2 1.9 
STD OF V   SSP






CORRELATION  (˜  y ,˜  w  H)= 0.8 
 
  LOW SERIAL AUTOCORR. 
OF y AND OF w
1  (0.1) 
HIGH SERIAL AUTOCORR. 
OF y AND OF w
1  (0.8) 
  τH
b =τ L
b = 0 
τH
e =τ L






b = 2000 
τH
b =τ L
b = 0 
τH
e =τ L






b = 2000 
MEAN VSSP
H   1.1 0.9 1.1 0.9 
STD OF VSSP
H   0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 
MEAN V   SSP
L 2.2 2.4 2.3 1.9 
STD OF V   SSP





We set γ = 4, β  =0.44, h=0.45. {w0, w2, wL, wH,1(j), y(j)} are defined in the main text of the paper in 4.3 (i), (ii). 
The transition matrix is per (4.5) with η1= 0.10, ηi= 0.09, i=2,3,4 and A1=A3= 0.05, A2=A4= 0.35. 
  37TABLE 3 
Equilibrium Security Returns 
Panel A 
 
CORRELATION  (˜  y ,˜  w  H)= 0.1 
 
  LOW SERIAL AUTOCORR. 
OF   AND OF  ˜  y  ˜  w  H  (0.1) 
HIGH SERIAL AUTOCORR. 
OF   AND OF  ˜  y  ˜  w  H  (0.8) 
  τH
b =τ L
b = 0 
τH
e =τ L
e = 0 
τH
b =τ L














b = 0 
τH
e =τ L
e = 0 
τH
b =τ L














  11.5 8.5  9.2 10.9 8.0  8.6 
STD OF r
e
  9.2 5.8 6.2 9.4 5.9 6.4 
MEAN r
b
  4.6 3.2 2.7 4.6 3.2 2.7 
STD OF r
b
  7.8 4.4 3.8 7.6 4.2 3.6 
MEAN r
f
  0.8 0.0 -0.6 0.9 0.0 -0.6 
STD OF r
f
  7.4 4.4 3.5 7.4 4.4 3.4 
MEAN r
p
  10.6 8.5  9.8 10.0 7.9  9.2 
STD OF r
p




CORRELATION  (˜  y ,˜  w  H)= 0.8 
 
  LOW SERIAL AUTOCORR. 
OF    AND OF  ˜  y  ˜  w  H  (0.1) 
HIGH SERIAL AUTOCORR. 
OF    AND OF  ˜  y  ˜  w  H  (0.8) 
  τH
b =τ L
b = 0 
τH
e =τ L
e = 0 
τH
b =τ L














b = 0 
τH
e =τ L
e = 0 
τH
b =τ L














  11.5 8.6  8.6 11.0 8.0  8.7 
STD OF r
e
  9.1 5.7 6.4 9.3 5.8 6.2 
MEAN r
b
  4.6 3.2 2.7 4.6 3.2 2.7 
STD OF r
b
  7.8 4.4 3.6 7.7 4.2 3.6 
MEAN r
f
  0.8 0.0 -0.6 0.9 0.0 -0.6 
STD OF r
f
  7.4 4.4 3.4 7.4 4.4 3.5 
MEAN r
p
  10.7 8.5  9.2 10.1 8.0  9.3 
STD OF r
p
  6.0 5.8 5.8 6.2 5.9 5.7 
 
We set γ = 4, β  =0.44, h=0.45. {w0, w2, wL, wH,1(j), y(j)} are defined in the main text of the paper in 4.3 (i), (ii). The transition 
matrix is per (4.5) with η1= 0.10, ηi= 0.09, i=2,3,4 and A1=A3= 0.05, A2=A4= 0.35. 
The mean security return is defined as 100 x [{mean of the 20-year holding period return}
1/20 - 1].  The standard deviation of the 
return is defined as 100 x [std {(20-year holding period return)
 1/20}]. 
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TABLE 4 
 




CORRELATION  (˜  y ,˜  w  H)= 0.1 
 
  LOW SERIAL AUTOCORR. 
OF   AND OF  ˜  y  ˜  w  H  (0.1) 
HIGH SERIAL AUTOCORR. 
OF   AND OF  ˜  y  ˜  w  H  (0.8) 
  τH
b =τ L
b = 0 
τH
e =τ L
e = 0 
τH
b =τ L










b = 2000 
τH
b =τ L
b = 0 
τH
e =τ L
e = 0 
τH
b =τ L












  γ = 4  γ = 6  γ = 4  γ = 6  γ = 4  γ = 6  γ = 4 γ = 6  γ = 4  γ = 6  γ = 4  γ = 6 
MEAN VSSP
H   0  0  1.0 2.3 0.9 2.2  0  0  1.1 2.4 0.9 2.3 
STD OF VSSP
H   0  0  0.7 1.4 0.8 1.4  0  0  0.8 1.5 0.9 1.4 
MEAN V   SSP
L 0  0  2.2 24.4 2.4 36.5  0  0  2.3 25.5 1.9 27.3 
STD OF V   SSP
L 0  0  1.3 13.5 2.3 27.5  0  0  1.2 13.9 1.8 17.3 
MEAN r
e
  11.5  11.4  8.5 7.9 9.2 8.7  11.0  10.9  8.0 7.4 8.7 8.2 
STD OF r
e
  9.2  11.1  5.8 5.9 6.2 6.3 9.3  11.0  5.8 5.7 6.2 6.2 
MEAN r
b
  4.6 4.5 3.2 2.7 2.7 2.2 4.6 4.5 3.2 2.7 2.7 2.2 
STD OF r
b
  7.8  10.2  4.4 5.3 3.8 4.4 7.7  10.1  4.2 5.1 3.6 4.1 
MEAN r
f
  0.8 -1.3 0.0 -2.4 -0.6 -2.8 0.9 -1.3 0.0 -2.4 -0.6 -2.8 
STD OF r
f
  7.4 9.6 4.4 5.2 3.5 3.9 7.4 9.6 4.4 5.2 5.7 3.9 
MEAN r
p
  10.6  12.7 8.5 10.3 9.8 11.4  10.1  12.1 8.0  9.8  9.3 10.9 
STD OF r
p










We set γ = 4, β  =0.44, h=0.45. {w0, w2, wL, wH,1(j), y(j)} are defined in the main text of the paper in 4.3 (i), (ii). 
The transition matrix is per (4.5) with η1= 0.10, ηi= 0.09, i=2,3,4 and A1=A3= 0.05, A2=A4= 0.35. 
The mean security return is defined as 100 x [{mean of the 20-year holding period return}
1/20 - 1].The standard deviation of the 
return is defined as 100 x [std {(20-year holding period return)
 1/20}]. 
  39TABLE 5 
 




CORRELATION (˜  y ,˜  w  H)= 0.1 




b = 0 
τH
e =τ L
e = 2000 
  h = 0.3  h = 0.45  h = 0.5 
MEAN VSSP
H   0.7 1.0 1.1 
STD OF VSSP
H   0.5 0.8 0.8 
MEAN V   SSP
L 1.5 2.2 2.3 
STD OF V   SSP
L 1.0 1.3 1.4 
MEAN r
e
  11.7 8.5  7.6 
STD OF r
e
  5.8 5.8 5.6 
MEAN r
b
  4.0 3.2 2.9 
STD OF r
b
  4.4 4.4 4.5 
MEAN r
f
  1.2 0.0 -0.3 
STD OF r
f
  4.7 4.4 4.3 
MEAN r
p
  10.5 8.5  7.9 
STD OF r
p















We set γ = 4, β  =0.44, h=0.45. {w0, w2, wL, wH,1(j), y(j)} are defined in the main text of the paper in 4.3 (i), (ii). 
The transition matrix is per (4.5) with η1= 0.10, ηi= 0.09, i=2,3,4 and A1=A3= 0.05, A2=A4= 0.35. 
The mean security return is defined as 100 x [{mean of the 20-year holding period return}
1/20 - 1].The standard deviation of the 
return is defined as 100 x [std {(20-year holding period return)
 1/20}]. 
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CORRELATION  (˜  y ,˜  w  H)= 0.1 
 
  LOW SERIAL AUTOCORR. 
OF    AND OF  ˜  y  ˜  w  H  (0.1) 
HIGH SERIAL AUTOCORR. 
OF    AND OF  ˜  y  ˜  w  H  (0.8) 
  τH
b =τ L
b = 0 
τH
e =τ L
e = 0 
τH
b =τ L














b = 0 
τH
e =τ L
e = 0 
τH
b =τ L















H   0.0 0.4  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.1 
STD OF VSSP
H   0.0 0.3  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.2 
MEAN V   SSP
L 0.0 20.0  12.5  0.0  19.0  8.4 
STD OF V   SSP
L 0.0 10.0  14.2  0.0  18.0 13.3 
MEAN r
e
  10.5 9.9  9.7  11.9  11.2 11.1 
STD OF r
e
  5.0 4.8  4.7  4.4  4.2  4.2 
MEAN r
b
  5.9 5.4  5.2  9.1  8.4  8.2 
STD OF r
b
  3.0 2.8  2.6  2.0  1.9  1.8 
MEAN r
f
  6.4 5.9  5.7  9.4  8.8  8.6 
STD OF r
f
  2.6 2.3  2.2  2.1  2.0  1.9 
MEAN r
p
  4.2 4.0  4.0  2.5  2.4  2.5 
STD OF r
p








We set γ = 4, β  =0.44, h=0.45. {w0, w2, wL, wH,1(j), y(j)} are defined in the main text of the paper in (4.3).The transition matrix is 
per (4.4) . In both cases  .  σ(y) / E(y) = 0.25,   σ (w
H ) / E(w
H ) = 0.10
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CORRELATION  (˜  y ,˜  w  H)= 0.1 
 
  LOW SERIAL AUTOCORR. 
OF   AND OF  ˜  y  ˜  w  H  (0.1) 
HIGH SERIAL AUTOCORR. 
OF   AND OF  ˜  y  ˜  w  H  (0.8) 
  τH
b =τ L
b = 0 
τH
e =τ L
e = 0 
τH
b =τ L















b = 0 
τH
e =τ L
e = 0 
τH
b =τ L















H   0.0 2.5  1.9  0.0  2.6  2.0 
STD OF VSSP
H   0.0 1.3  1.1  0.0  1.4  1.2 
MEAN V   SSP
L 0.0 29.4  23.7  0.0  30.6 24.1 
STD OF V   SSP
L 0.0 13.0  15.9  0.0  23.3 12.0 
MEAN r
e
  11.5 10.1  9.7 11.0 9.5  9.2 
STD OF r
e
  9.2 7.4  6.8  9.3  7.3  6.8 
MEAN r
b
  4.6 3.5  3.1  4.6  3.5  3.1 
STD OF r
b
  7.8 5.9  4.7  7.7  5.6  4.5 
MEAN r
f
  0.9 -0.5  -0.6  0.9  -0.4  -0.6 
STD OF r
f
  7.4 5.6  4.3  7.4  5.5  4.4 
MEAN r
p
  10.6 10.6  10.4  10.1  10.0  9.9 
STD OF r
p






We set γ = 4, β  =0.44, h=0.45. {w0, w2, wL, wH,1(j), y(j)} are defined in the main text of the paper in 4.3 (i), (ii). 
The transition matrix is per (4.5) with η1= 0.10, ηi= 0.09, i=2,3,4 and A1=A3= 0.05, A2=A4= 0.35. 
In both cases  .  σ(y) / E(y) = 0.25,   σ (w
H ) / E(w
H ) = 0.10
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CORRELATION  (˜  y ,˜  w  H)= 0.1 
LOW SERIAL AUTOCORR.OF   AND OF  ˜  y  ˜  w  H  (0.1) 
  τH
b =τ L
b = 0 
τH
e =τ L
e = 0 
τH
b =τ L













H   0.0 2.4  2.1 
STD OF VSSP
H   0.0 1.3  1.2 
MEAN V   SSP
L 0.0 26.1  33.5 
STD OF V   SSP
L 0.0 12.5  18.6 
MEAN r
e
  11.5 10.0  9.9 
STD OF r
e
  9.2 7.3  7.0 
MEAN r
b
  4.6 3.5  3.2 
STD OF r
b
  7.8 5.8  5.0 
MEAN r
f
  0.9 -0.5  -0.6 
STD OF r
f
  7.4 5.5  4.6 
MEAN r
p
  10.6 10.5  10.5 
STD OF r
p






We set γ = 4, β  =0.44, h=0.45. {w0, w2, wL, wH,1(j), y(j)} are defined in the main text of the paper in 4.3 (i), (ii). 
The transition matrix is per (4.5) with η1= 0.10, ηi= 0.09, i=2,3,4 and A1=A3= 0.05, A2=A4= 0.35. 
In both cases  .  σ(y) / E(y) = 0.25,   σ (w
H ) / E(w
H ) = 0.10















  43TABLE 9 
 




CORRELATION  (˜  y ,˜  w  H)= 0.1 
 
  LOW SERIAL AUTOCORR. 
OF AND   OF  ˜  y  ˜  w  H  (0.1) 
HIGH SERIAL AUTOCORR. 




b = 0 
τ0 =
e τH



























H   1.02 0.86 1.05  0.87 
STD OF VSSP
H   0.74 0.76 0.75  0.83 
MEAN V   SSP
L 2.15 2.42 2.24  1.89 
STD OF V   SSP






CORRELATION  (˜  y ,˜  w  H)= 0.8 
 
  LOW SERIAL AUTOCORR. 
OF   AND OF  ˜  y  ˜  w  H  (0.1) 
HIGH SERIAL AUTOCORR. 




b = 0 
τ0 =
e τH



























H   1.04 0.86 1.07  0.88 
STD OF VSSP
H   0.76 0.77 0.77  0.85 
MEAN V   SSP
L 2.18 2.37 2.26  1.86 
STD OF V   SSP









We set γ = 4, β  =0.44, h=0.45. {w0, w2, wL, wH,1(j), y(j)} are defined in the main text of the paper in 4.3 (i), (ii). 
The transition matrix is per (4.5) with η1= 0.10, ηi= 0.09, i=2,3,4 and A1=A3= 0.05, A2=A4= 0.35. 
  44TABLE 10 




CORRELATION  (˜  y ,˜  w  H)= 0.1 
 
  LOW SERIAL AUTOCORR. 
OF    AND OF  ˜  y ˜  w  H  (0.1) 
HIGH SERIAL AUTOCORR. 




b = 0 
τ0 =
e τH




























  8.5 9.2 8.0  8.6 
STD OF r
e
  5.8 6.2 5.9  6.4 
MEAN r
b
  3.2 2.7 3.2  2.7 
STD OF r
b
  4.4 3.8 4.2  3.6 
MEAN r
f
  0.0 -0.6 0.0  -0.6 
STD OF r
f
  4.4 3.5 4.4  3.4 
MEAN r
p
  8.5 9.8 7.9  9.2 
STD OF r
p




CORRELATION  (˜  y ,˜  w  H)= 0.8 
 
  LOW SERIAL AUTOCORR. 
OF    AND OF  ˜  y ˜  w  H  (0.1) 
HIGH SERIAL AUTOCORR. 




b = 0 
τ0 =
e τH




























  8.6 9.3 8.0 8.7 
STD OF r
e
  5.7 6.1 5.8 6.2 
MEAN r
b
  3.2 2.7 3.2 2.7 
STD OF r
b
  4.4 3.8 4.2 3.6 
MEAN r
f
  -0.0 -0.6 0.0  0.6 
STD OF r
f
  4.4 3.5 4.4 3.5 
MEAN r
p
  8.6 9.9 8.0 9.3 
STD OF r
p
  5.8 5.6 5.9 5.7 
 
 
We set γ = 4, β  =0.44, h=0.45. {w0, w2, wL, wH,1(j), y(j)} are defined in the main text of the paper in 4.3 (i), (ii). The transition 
matrix is per (4.5) with η1= 0.10, ηi= 0.09, i=2,3,4 and A1=A3= 0.05, A2=A4= 0.35. 









Percentage Increase in Welfare, EU( ) of a Representative 




CORRELATION  (˜  y ,˜  w  H)= 0.1 
 
LOW SERIAL AUTOCORR. 
OF y  AND OF  ˜  ˜  w  H  (0.1) 
HIGH SERIAL AUTOCORR. 




CORRELATION  (˜  y ,˜  w  H)= 0.8 
 
LOW SERIAL AUTOCORR. 
OF   AND OF  ˜  y  ˜  w  H (0.1) 
HIGH SERIAL AUTOCORR. 










Maximum Voluntary Transfer from Old to Young in Exchange for Introducing the 





CORRELATION  (˜  y ,˜  w  H)= 0.1 
 
LOW SERIAL AUTOCORR. 
OF y  AND OF  ˜  ˜  w  H  (0.1) 
HIGH SERIAL AUTOCORR. 




CORRELATION  (˜  y ,˜  w  H)= 0.8 
 
LOW SERIAL AUTOCORR. 
OF y  AND OF  ˜  ˜  w  H  (0.1) 
HIGH SERIAL AUTOCORR. 










We set γ = 4, β  =0.44, h=0.45. {w0, w2, wL, wH,1(j), y(j)} are defined in the main text of the paper in 4.3 (i), (ii). 
The transition matrix is per (4.5) with η1= 0.10, ηi= 0.09, i=2,3,4 and A1=A3= 0.05, A2=A4= 0.35. 
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